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Handbook of Equity (Hornbook Series). By Henry L. McClintock. St. Paul: West
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Cases on Equity. By Henry L. McClintock. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1936.
Pp. 1263. $6.oo.
The treatise is a work which is a real joy to read: Professor McClintock gives
abundant evidence of voluminous reading, and of a most intimate understanding of
the whole "soul" of equitable doctrine. It is still curious, from the point of view of an
English lawyer (though less so to one who is, from actual visits, familiar with the
refinement of specialization in vogue in American law schools, and indeed in most
professions in America), to find that the subject of trusts is entirely absent from a
book on general equity. In England the trust, being regarded as historically the main-
spring of equity, finds an honorable and roomy place in any textbook on equity; and
it must be put down to the insular prejudice of an English reviewer that the excision
of trusts, though it undoubtedly makes for brevity, seems nevertheless to militate
against the cohesion of the treatise. But one is less conscious of this lack in Professor
McClintock's treatise than in any other we have read, owing to the comprehensiveness
of his general treatment and the lucidity of his style. It was a source of real pleasure
to find that he devotes a whole chapter to the arrangement of equitable doctrines
and institutions under the heading, Maxims of Equity. These do not all, it is true,
go to the root of equity. The majority are, as Dean Pound has shown, of compara-
tively recent date, and so equity cannot be said to have been built up on them as
foundations; they are rather the fruit of observation of developed equitable doctrine,
or, if they can be in any way regarded as the architects of it, they were inarticulate
architects. The ideas embodied in them are far older than their articulate expression.
But whatever their history, their practical value in a scheme of arrangement is im-
mense.
The learned author has taken immense pains in historical research, and he has in
generous quality the gift of compression. The important truth that the early common
law judges in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, and the justices in eyre until still
later, enunciated equity as well as law, is conveyed by him with the utmost clarity in
less than two pages. It is surprising, however, to find no reference to the work of the
late Dr. Bollard on the equity of the justices of eyre, a storehouse of learning which,
though its conclusions are now not generally accepted, is indispensable for the student
of legal history.
With a few of the learned author's interpretations of English cases we feel inclined
to differ. He overestimates the effect of Lord Eldon's judgment in Lane v. Newdigate,x
when he says of it that the evasive device which Lord Eldon adopted in that case,
of granting an injunction prohibitive in form, but admittedly intended to compel the
performance of affirmative acts, "has since often been followed." Certainly Lord
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Eldon gloried in the contemplation of this effect of his injunction, but surely, this
object has been kept carefully out of sight in all subsequent cases, except possibly in
Catt v. Tourle.2 It was certainly not uppermost in the mind of Lord St. Leonards in
Lunley v. Wagner.3 That great chancellor stressed the point that the harshness of
the injunction was more apparent than real for two reasons: firstly, it was open to
Miss Wagner to approach Lumley with a proposal for a new contract to supersede
the old one if she were dissatisfied with it; and secondly, had Lumley sued her at com-
mon law for damages, the measure of damages would undoubtedly have been high.
The views of the learned author on the very recent decision of Branson, J., in Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelsol;4 would be full of interest, and will perhaps be revealed to
us in the second edition which, we feel sure, will at no distant date be necessitated by
the success which his book is certain to obtain.
A cleavage between English and American law is envisaged where none can surely
be said to exist, by these words: "contracts for the sale of corporate stock are enforced
in England almost as a matter of course, unless the stock is that of a public nature.
In this country, such contracts are enforced only when the value of the stock cannot
be easily ascertained, or other stock in that particular corporation cannot be obtained
which will answer plaintiff's purpose equally well." As authority for his view of Eng-
lish doctrine he cites Duncuft v. Albrecht,s but this is really a case laying down not a
rule but an exception. The rule is undoubtedly that which was enunciated in Cud v.
Rutter,6 that specific performance of an agreement to transfer stock waill not normally
be granted on the ground that "there can be no difference between one man's stock
and another's;" But, where, as in Dunwuft v. Albrecht, stock or shares are such as can-
not always be bought in the market, this reason disappears and the court will order
specific performance of an agreement for the purchase of such securities.
Professor McClintock tells us that "the Restatement of Contracts says that a con-
tract cannot be avoided for a unilateral mistake unless the other party knew or ought
to have known of the mistake. This, in effect, denies any relief for a unilateral mis-
take, since taking advantage of the known mistake of another party is included in the
definition of fraud." This accepts the view taken by Farwell, J., in May v. Platt,7 of
what should have been the ground of the decisions in Garrard v. Frankd,8 Harris v.
Pepperell,9 and Paget v. Marshall. °
Professor McClintock raises a question which in England at the present day is a
very pressing one, and on which Professor Lauterpacht has recently written a most
learned article entitled "Contracts to Break a Contract."It If a contract cannot, to
the knowledge of both parties, be performed without breaking a prior contract binding
upon one of them, is the subsequent contract valid? If Mr. Justice Holmes' famous
theory of contract is correct, an affirmative answer would seem to be indicated, on the
ground that a contracting party is not definitely bound to perform his contract but is
committing a perfectly lawful act if he elects to break it and pay damages. Professor
McClintock reminds us that the same view was taken by Lord Coke, who "in one case
issued a prohibition to prevent specific enforcement of an agreement for the reason
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that it nullified the intent of the covenantor to perform or pay damages." The learned
author's estimate that "that construction of the contract was not in accord with the
purpose of the parties, nor the historic position of the common law," is in accord with
the view recently expressed by Du Panca, J. in British Homophone Co. v. Fury and
Crystallate Grantaphone Record Manufacturing Co.12
The case-book is an extremely valuable one, and the selection made by the learned
compiler is most judicious. A student who can master the contents of both books will
not only be a formidable antagonist in the courts, but will have donned much of the
panoply of an accomplished jurist. Professor McClintock is to be most heartily con-
gratulated on his achievements. H. G. HAN uy*
* Lincoln College, Oxford.
Handbook of Anglo-American Legal History. By Max Radin. St. Paul: West Pub-
lishing Co., 1936. Pp. xxii, 534. $5.00.
Whatever Professor Radin does will be well done. Before we open this book we
know that it will be the product of intellect and scholarship, couched in a clear, simple
and graceful style.
Apart from the preface and the first two chapters, the book does not deal with the
history of the law by periods. No attempt is made to study the development of the
common law as a whole; that is, to study the interrelated development of substantive
law, courts, and procedure, by periods. If the student who uses this book wishes to
get an idea of the condition of some topic of substantive law, such as real property
or contract, at any given stage of the development of the common law courts, or if
he wishes to get an idea of the corresponding methods of trial, or of procedure, he
must work it out himself. In doing this, he will be helped greatly by the tables at the
beginning of the book.
Whether each separate topic should be developed as an entirety from beginning
to the end, as is here done, or whether the whole law should be developed as an en-
tirety, its development necessarily divided into suitable periods (if any such really
exist), is a matter of opinion. Continuity in presenting each topic is undoubtedly
secured by this arrangement: but unless the student makes diligent use of the tables,
and of Chapter I on the political history of England, he cannot get a picture of any
period of the development of Anglo-American law. He cannot see a living, working
system of law develop, unfold, and broaden down. If law is a unity, that unity is cut
through and through in many different places; and before us we find not a living body,
not an entire dead body, but many different organs dissected neatly from the once
living body; with a chart by which we can place most of the organs, and with infor-
maiton which makes it possible in most instances, to understand the effect of one
upon the other. But it is a matter of opinion, of judgment, of sentiment to decide
between these two methods of presenting the history of Anglo-American law. It is
impracticable, and in a book of this size, impossible, to attempt to superimpose one
on the other.
The inevitable result of this treatment, as the author points out,' is that the devel-
opment of law in the United States is never considered as an entire subject. It is but
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